Although both the ʿAbbāsid caliphs of Sunnism and the various Imams of Shi'ism were members of the Prophet Muḥ ammad's tribe of Hāshim, the descendants of Hāshim's fraternal nephew Umayya dominated the Islamic world for most of its first century and went on to hold power in Spain for another 300 years.
contextual character of the written evidence. In this they reflect, of course, the broader historiographical currents of the last few decades; positivism has been supplanted by various perspectives that emphasise the social construction of culture and how all historical memory is shaped by the present in which it is remembered.
5 Furthermore (and related to this heightened historiographical awareness), there is a strong emphasis in these articles on perspectives that are partially concealed by the majority of our sources -concealment that has often been increased by the biases and interests of modern historians. Many of the early Arabic sources were the products of imperial centres -Baghdad, Samarra and Córdoba -and so themselves construct the centrality of those centres against their "peripheries".
6 (And even other, more local, sources were in some respects products of the same centre-periphery power relationship.
7 ) The sources also tend to privilege other hegemonies, too -notably here, rulers over rebels and men over women. 8 The first article, by Harry Munt, "Caliphal Imperialism and Ḥ ijāzī Elites in the Second/ Eighth Century", issues twin challenges -to the dynastic terms in which early Islamic history is still usually conceived and to the dominant narrative of Umayyad imperial failure. Munt examines relations between the West Arabian province of the Ḥ ijāz, where both shrine towns of Mecca and Medina were located, and the imperial centre -first Umayyad Syria (661-683 and 692-750) and then ʿAbbāsid Iraq (after 750). Whereas there was only one major revolt that won substantial Ḥ ijāzī support during the Syrian Umayyad period -the so-called anti-caliphate of Ibn al-Zubayr (r. 683-692) -there were a series of revolts in the Ḥ ijāz after the ʿAbbāsid revolution in 750. Three occurred in the 25 years between 762 and 786. As Munt observes, this is part of a pattern across the whole empire: "the Umayyad caliphs, at least after the second fitna, may actually have done a better job of convincing provincial elites of the imperial rationale than their early ʿAbbāsid successors". In the Ḥ ijāz, the "provincial elite" consisted of Meccans and Medinans, whose ancestors had been present during the founding decades of Islam and had presided over many of the Islamic conquests. They generally benefitted from the imperial project and recognised that their interests lay in supporting the ruling family, to whom, after all, they were closely related. Even in the tumultuous decades after the ʿAbbāsid revolution, only one of the three major Ḥ ijāzī revolts garnered substantial support. Indeed, one could almost suggestalthough Munt does not explicitly push his argument this far -that, from the perspective of imperial power structures, the first Islamic empire might in some ways be better conceived as "Ḥ ijāzī" rather than "Umayyad" or "ʿAbbāsid". Majied Robinson's "From Traders to Caliphs: Prosopography, Geography and the Marriages of Muḥ ammad's Tribe" also addresses how we should conceive of the ruling elite of the early Islamic empire. He argues that the data about the marriages made by Muḥ ammad's tribe of Quraysh from the mid-sixth century through to the mid-eighth century, as preserved in the Kitāb Nasab Quraysh of al-Zubayrī (d. 851), is broadly accurate and so indicative of social change in a nascent and then developed empire. He further suggests that we do not abandon the tribe as a unit of social analysis: tribes are socially constructed, of course, but like all social constructs they matter as much as any simple material or biological reality.
9 What the prosopographical data suggests is that the generation of Quraysh just before Muḥ ammad's own married exogamously (i.e. outside Quraysh) relatively frequently (over 40% of recorded marriages). However, Muḥ ammad's own generation married exogamously even more (more than 60% of recorded pairings). Furthermore, they married into a far wider range of tribes, from a much wider geographical area. This picture correlates with the new status achieved by the Ḥ ijāzī elite as the centre of a growing tribal federation and nascent empire in the 620s, 630s and 640s; Quraysh's much more local marriages in the mid-to-late-sixth century would suggest a more local political significance for the tribe. Finally, Robinson also analyses the marriages of the Umayyad caliphs and their sons (mid-seventh to mid-eighth century). He shows that this ruling branch of Quraysh married exogamously far less than the other cohorts; fewer than 15% of their marriages were to non-Qurashīs, suggesting, he proposes, "an increasingly distant elite that no longer needed to marry into the leading families of the Islamic project in order to maintain their authority". For all that the Umayyads were part of the wider Ḥ ijāzī imperial elite, being an Umayyad (or rather, being an Umayyad caliph or his son), did have consequences for relations with the wider society and thus for a sense of group identity.
Like Robinson, Hagemann also considers what the later, ninth-and tenth-century Arabic tradition can tell us about the first century of Islam, but she examines the narrative historical material recorded by al-Balādhurī (d. c. 892) and al-Ṭ abarī (d. 923). And like Munt, Hagemann is interested in rebellion and what it can tell us. However, Hagemann is wary of drawing any positivist conclusions from her material; rather, she focuses on the ways that rebellions are presented in the later sources. In "Challenging Authority: Al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭ abarī on Khārijism during the Reign of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān", Hagemann notes that almost all the extant historical reports (akhbār) on the so-called Khārijite rebellions during the reign of the first Syrian Umayyad caliph, Muʿāwiya, are preserved only by al-Balādhurī or al-Ṭ abarī, or both. She argues that the two scholars probably had access to similar material but made deliberate selections in order to make very different uses of the stories about the Khārijites.
10 Al-Balādhurī, as a courtier and man of letters, was interested in "ethics and morals", as well as "entertaining stories". His material includes startling stories of female rebels and uses the Khārijite rebels themselves almost approvingly in order to point up the Umayyads' moral failings. Al-Ṭ abarī, as a 9 For some thought-provoking discussion of key literature on this topic, see Patricia Crone, "The Tribe and the State", in unity-minded (jamāʿī) religious scholar and student of the Muslim polity, was more concerned with "statecraft and communal cohesion"; 11 he condemns the Khārijites where they are in open rebellion but is more approving of non-militant Khārijites who were persecuted for their challenges to Umayyad misconduct.
12
The last two articles turn to Umayyad Spain. In "'They Fled to Their Remote Islands': Al-Ḥ akam II and al-Majūs in the Muqtabas of Ibn Ḥ ayyān", Ann Christys also proposes a more sceptical and historically-contextualised reading of the sources. She notes that al-Ḥ akam II's (r. 961-976) efforts to repel Viking raids are reported only in a mid-eleventh-century compilation by Ibn Ḥ ayyān (d. 1076) . Whereas historians have tended to treat this material on the Vikings (Arabic, Majūs; Latin, Nordimanni) as simple factual evidence, Christys notes that -just as al-Balādhurī's and al-Ṭ abarī's concerns lay elsewhere than the facts of rebellion in the seventh century -Ibn Ḥ ayyān focuses much more on al-Ḥ akam II and his court than on the Vikings themselves. The elaborate ceremonial preparations at Córdoba and Madīnat al-Zahrāʾ for the annual campaigns against the raiders are described in detail; the raiders themselves and their impact scarcely figure at all. The impression is of tenth-century court propaganda descriptions of legitimating ceremonial parades preserved in the eleventh-century history of Ibn Ḥ ayyān -himself, of course, a partisan of the (in fact now terminally imperilled) Umayyad cause. , which describe events in ninth-, tenth-and eleventh-century Spain. When read in the wider context of early Islamic literature on parenthood among the ruling elite, the chronicles' message that successful lineages are founded upon diligent imitation of patriarchal example is accentuated. For example, a young ʿAbd al-Raḥ mān b. Muʿāwiya -the future first Umayyad amīr of al-Andalus -is depicted by Ibn al-Quṭ iyya in attendance at an audience between his grandfather, the Syrian Umayyad Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik, and Sāra, the granddaughter of a former Visigothic king of Spain. Sāra seeks Hishām's protection and assumes the status of his ward; the young orphan ʿAbd al-Raḥ mān is likewise represented as Hishām's son in his father's absence. In later life, ʿAbd al-Raḥ mān is said to have been scrupulous in the protection offered to Sāra at Córdoba. The decline of the dynasty in the early eleventh century is blamed on the failure of a son to heed his father's advice (and so also on a father's failure to educate his son properly): al-Muẓ affar, son of the Umayyads' vizier, al-Manṣ ūr (r. 981-1002) was profligate and arrogant, provoking a fatal civil war in the Spanish Umayyad caliphate; the contrast with Hishām's relationship with ʿAbd al-Raḥ mān is clear. These stories and others bring to mind the Qābūs-nāma of Kaykāvūs, an Iranian aristocrat of late tenth century, where the training necessary for aristocrats' children was described.
As Clarke observes in her conclusion, in the Umayyad world, as elsewhere, elite masculinity was socially constructed: "a presumption of masculine authority within the As Hagemann notes, these conclusions match those arrived at by other scholars who looked at other case studies from the two compilers' material. household shaped the way … rulers were described … and how … fathers related to their sons". Being an Umayyad ruler was not something simply biologically determined, but rather something imagined and projected. Of course, this tension between social construction and material fact lies at the heart of all historiography but it is especially salient in the five pieces on the Umayyads and their memory that follow. For Munt, "attitudes" and "negotiation" are central to the project of imperial dominion over others. The elite of the Ḥ ijāz were closely related to their rulers, whether from the Umayyad or ʿAbbāsid branch of Quraysh; the status they negotiated within the empire reflected these connections and their relative political quietism accorded with it. Robinson reminds us how such identities founded upon kinship were largely built upon marriage and reproduction, and shows that the later texts that promoted the memory and status of kin-groups can nonetheless be used to reconstruct these processes. In contrast, Hagemann and Christys focus on the contemporary concerns of our sources: the courtly and politico-theological interests of Iraqis in the ninth and tenth centuries, when they narrated resistance to past Umayyad rule, and the reiteration of past Umayyad military pomp in the very final decades of Umayyad power. Together, the articles point to an exciting future for the study of "the first dynasty of Islam", 14 in which previously marginal perspectives are regained, and new approaches provide new answers to the perennial questions of dynasty and empire.
14 The phrase is, of course, Gerald Hawting's, in his First Dynasty of Islam.
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